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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

I
I
\

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 773 7

vs.

AUGUST SCHREIBER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF CASE

Except to the extent that the record will support the
State's assertion that the defendant procured the order of the
trial court, dated October 20, 1949, through misrepresentations
sufficient to warrant setting aside of that order, defendant's
statement of the facts of the case is complete and correct, and
we accept it.
The State's position is this: any court has inherent power
to set aside an order it has made when that order is procured
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through fraud,· deceit, or misrepresentation. The order of the
trial court made October 20, 1949, setting aside the conviction
of defendant and dismissing the action was entered upon
certain representations being made to the trial court by defendant as to the necessity of that order. The record itself,
regardless of what might be considered extra-judicial reports
coming to the attention of the trial judge, will support the
fact that these representations were false when made, and
therefore the court had jurisdiction to revoke the order made
upon such misrepresentations.
A good argument may be made that the amendment to
section 105-36-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, by Chapter
24, Laws of Utah 1943, does violence to the pardoning power
as set forth in Article VII, Section 12, Utah Constitution. Under
the 1943 amendment, after a defendant has been placed upon
probation, the district court "may if it be compatible with the
public interest either upon motion of the district attorney or
of its own motion terminate the sentence or set aside the
plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and dismiss the
action and discharge the defendant." (Emphasis added.)
Action taken under the emphasized portion of the statute
quoted would appear to be an exercise of the pardoning
power, and we doubt that such action may. be allowed a trial
court under the constitutional provision for the Board of Pardons. Indeed, this is the theory upon which the district attorney
sought to have set aside the order of October 20, 1949, setting
aside the conviction of the defendant, dismissing the action,
and discharging him (R. 57-58). The trial court did not
enter its order of June 9, 1951, vacating the order of October
20, 1949, on this theory (R. 107-108), but rather, based his
4
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action upon the proposition that the earlier order was obtained
through misrepresentation of the intent of the defendant and
the facts and circumstances surrounding his case. We believe
that the order of the trial court made June 9, 1951, vacating
its order of October 20, 1949, setting aside defendant's conviction and dismissing the action, was properly based upon
the fact that the latter order was procured through misrepresentations made to the court, and this court need not therefore
consider the constitutional quesion. We shall, therefore, present
this one point only.

STATEMENT OF POINTS

I.
A COURT HAS INHERENT JURISDICTION TO VACATE AN ORDER MADE BY IT WHEN THAT ORDER
IS PROCURED THROUGH FRAUD, DECEIT OR MISREPRESENTATIONS. THE ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION AND DISMISSING THE
ACTION WAS BASED UPON MISREPRESENTATIONS
MADE TO THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH ARE SHOWN
ON THE RECORD, AND THAT COURT THEREFORE
ACTED PROPERLY IN VACATING ITS ORDER.

ARGUMENT
I.

A COURT HAS INHERENT JURISDICTION TO VACATE AN ORDER MADE BY IT WHEN THAT ORDER

5
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IS PROCURED THROUGH FRAUD, DECEIT OR MISREPRESENTATIONS. THE ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION AND DISMISSING THE
ACTION WAS BASED UPON MISREPRESENTATIONS
MADE TO THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH ARE SHOWN
ON THE RECORD, AND THAT COURT THEREFORE
ACTED PROPERLY IN VACATING ITS ORDER.
The general rule in civil cases is that a judgment procured through fraud, deceit, or misrepresentations may be
vacated by the court. }1 Am. Jur. p. 282, Sec. 738, "Judgments." The same rule applies in criminal matters. In the case
of Lyons v. Goldstein, 47 N. E. 2d 425, 290 N. Y. 19, the
court stated:
The inherent power of a court to set aside its judgment which was procured by fraud and misrepresentation cannot be doubted. (Cases cited) . No logical
distinction can be made between such power over judgments in civil cases and such power over judgments in
criminal cases. There is notping unique about a judgment or its execution in criminal cases which excepts it
from the rules applicable to judgments generally and
the inherent powers ·of the courts with .reference to
them.
See also People ex rei. Walsh on Behalf of Katz v. Ashworth,
Warden, 56 N.Y. S. 2d 791. Taking this to be the applicable
rule, we shall review the records of the hearings held October
20, 1949, and June 9, 1951, to show wherein the order of
October 20, 1949, setting aside the conviction of defendant,
dismissing the action, and discharging defendant from the
supervision of the State Parole Department was obtained by
6
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misrepresenting to the trial court the facts and circumstances
surrounding defendant's application for the order of October
20, 1949, setting aside his conviction and dismissing the action
against him.
The testimony of Dr. Henning on the two hearings is
illustrative of this. On the hearing of October 20, 1949, after
testifying to the physical condition of defendant, that witness
testified as follows (R. Ex. A, p. 2-3):
Q. And what is the remedy for that?

A. Well, of course the immediate remedy is usually
sedatives and rest but the permanent remedy is
also a great deal of rest and lower altitudes and
more regular atmosphere; warmer and not too
changeable.
Q. And would you say that Dr. Schreiber's health
would increase definitely if he was in a lower altitude and more constant warm climate?

A. I would say yes.

*

*

*

*

THE COURT: Doctor, do you recommend that Dr.
Schrieber be transferred or be permitted to go to
a lower climate?
A. At least for quite some time.
THE COURT: And do you think his rematmng in
Utah would be detrimental to his health?
A. At least in the wintertime would be.
There is a sense of positiveness and urgency here. The recitals
introductory to the order signed the same day also indicate
7
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this sense of urgency for the sake of the health of defendant
and his son (R. 63-64). Yet defendant did not leave for
Florida until well into the month of December, 1949, and
then only when the trial judge had indicated he was contemplating reconsidering the order of October 20, 1949 (R. 108).
On the hearing held June 9, 1951, at which Dr. Henning's
testimony was subject to cross-examination-it was not on
October 20, 1949, (R. 94-95 )-he was not nearly so positive
as to the necessity for defendant living in a lower altitude
or more stable climate (R. 101) ;

CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. Roberts:

Q. At the time you examined him, I think it was in
September, 1949, you were of the opinion that what
he should do was move to a lower climate-we
can call it a lower climate?
A. Well, it usually helps people to be in a little lower
altitude, ·who are extremely upset emotionally.

Q. And it was your opinion then if he would go to a
lower altitude that his physical condition would
improve?
A. And I thought it would help quite a bit to get away
from here, and be in a lower altitude.
Q. At that time you thought the climate and altitude
he would find in Florida would be extremely beneficial to his health?
A. At that time that is what I thought.
8.
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Q. Is there anything that would change your mind
at the present time?

A. He didn't seem to get any better. I was in constant
communication with him, through his letters, and
he informed me he wasn't getting any better, and,
in fact, asked me several times if I couldn't come
down.
At the hearing October 20, 1949, the defendant testified
that he intended to leave the state of Utah permanently and
take up residence in Florida. We quote from the record, Exhibit A, page 4:
Q. Now, Dr. Schrieber, when you are able to do so,
it is your plan to leave the State of Utah permanently and go where?
A. To the state of Florida.
Q. And you would take your son with you?
A. Yes.
This defendant conveniently forgot at the hearing held June 9,
1951. We quote from the record, p. 78-79:
Q. And you recall the proceedings that were had in
court the 20th day of October, 1949, at the time
when Mr. Maw represented you in this transaction,
with reference to having the order setting aside the
conviction obtained in this case?
A. Yes.

Q. And you recall at that time, do you not, that you
represented to the court it was your intention permanently to leave the state of Utah?
9
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A. I don't remember what it was.

Q. Well, wasn't it a fact at that time you said it was
your intention to permanently leave the state of
Utah?
A. It was my intention to leave Utah, yes.

Q. Permanently leave?
A. Permanently wasn't definite. I wasn't told to go.

Q. Do you recall the matter of your permanently leaving the state was discussed during those proceedings?
A. I don't recall exactly any more.

Q. Didn't your counsel, Mr. Maw, represent to the
court you would leave the state and you would stay
away permanenlty from the state because of your
health, and practice your profession in Florida?
A. He said I would leave the state for my health, but
I dont' recall I would leave permanently.
The record further shows that the trial judge, in granting the
order of October 20, 1949, setting aside the conviction of
defendant and dismissing the charge against him, took this
extraordinary action upon a belief, given him by representations made by defendant's counsel, Mr. Maw, that defendant
was going to a lucrative position which his health would
permit him to occupy, and which would enable him to become
established in his profession in Florida. Mr. Maw testified
to this on direct examination (R. 89), and upon examination
by the trial co1_.1rt (R. 9 3-94). Yet defendant knew nothing
of this when he was examined thereon by the court on June
9, 1951. We quote from the record, page 85-86:
10
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EXAMINATION BY THE COURT

*

*

*

*

Q. Now, at the time you left here you had a job in a
hospital in Florida that was going to pay you about
three hundred a month for about two or three
hours' work a day?

A. No, I didn't.
Q. Didn't you have such a job as that?

A. No, I was very ill at
an office there.

~at

time. I was going to open

Q. Would it surprise you if I told you Dr. Maw told
me you had a job in Florida, that would pay you
practically three hundred a month for two or three
hours' work a day-that would surprise you?

A. That would surprise me.
Q. It would if I told you that?

A. Yes, it would.
when examined further along this line by his counsel, Mr. Maw,
defendant's memory simply failed him (R. 86):
Q. Mr. Schreiber, don't you remember telling me in
Miami, Florida, there was a possibility of your having a job in a hospital down there, or some place,
where you would have a basic income when you
came, and you discussed this matter with me?

A. I just don't recall. I said I could get it if I will go
down there. I have a license there, I am sure I
could get a position down there.
Q. That is, a position where you could work part time,
and carry on your pJ:ofession?

A. I don't recall that, exactly.
11
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Q. Do you remember discussing anything like that
with me, at all?
A. I can't recall that, that I mentioned I would get a
job down there, get a job in a hospital-! don't
just recall it-1 just don't know.
When defendant was passing through Utah in November,
1950, and wished to determine his status within this state, he
did not, as one would who is presumably acting in good faith
under the circumstances, consult the judge whose order he
wanted interpreted. Rather he went to another judge who
had had nothing to do with his case (R. 81, 88). He apparently
gave the judge who had ordered the setting aside of his conviction a wide berth. This, as noted by Judge Van Cott, does
not impress one that the defendant was acting in good faith
(R. 110).
It should be further noted that defendant's health, for

-some strange reason, began improving for the first time after
he returned to Utah (R: 83, 99, 100-101). Further, defendant
made no effort to establish a practice either in Florida or California (R. 99) .
The entire record dealing with the order of October 20,
1949, and the subsequent proceedings whereby that order was
revoked show that the trial judge was misled in granting that
order. That order is extraordinary in that it sets aside a conviction upon a verdict, dismisses the action, and discharges the
defendant. It has the effect of wiping the slate clean, leaving
the defendant. with a clear record. The trial court could as
easily have continued defendant on probation under the supervision of the Adult Probation and Parole Department, and

12
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allowed defendant to seek out-of-state supervision under the
Uniform Out-of-State Supervision Act, Sections 85-9-81 to
85-9-84, Utah Code Annotated 1943, and the compact between this state and Florida in effect at that time. Rather,
it chose to act under the power granted it by the amendment
made to section 105-36-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, by
Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1943, permitting trial courts to "set
aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and
dismiss the action and discharge the defendant." One can
only assume that the trial court acted thus on a belief, engendered by defendant, that it was his intent to move to
Florida permanently to rehabilitate himself and the health
of him and his son, and that such a move was urgent and indispensable. Yet within eight months after leaving the state,
the defendant was returned, located in a home, and preparing
to resume a professional practice, his health improving only
since that return! We believe that the .record, apart from any
extra-judicial utterances and statements that might have been
considered by the trial judge, clearly indicates that the defendant never, at any time, actually intended to go to Florida
or California or anywhere except for a long enough period
for the matter to "blow over" so that he could re-establish
a practice in Salt Lake City with the clear record given him
by the court based upon his misrepresentations.
Defendant urges in his brief that if the order of October
20, 1949, was conditioned upon his remaining out of the state
permanently and in any event, it would be a condition of
banishment, and therefore void. We have no quarrel with this.
That is, we agree with defendant's statement of the law that
an order of banishment is void as against public policy.

13
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However, to assume that the trial judge revoked the order
of October 20, 1949, setting aside the conviction of defendant
and dismissing the action against him, simply because he returned to this state, is to misconstrue the theory upon which
the trial judge was acting in revoking that order. That judge
revoked his earlier order because it was shown to him that
that order was procured in bad faith and upon misrepresentations as to the facts and intent of defendant at the time the
order issued. Defendant's early return to the state was merely
a circumstance which, along with others, indicated that he had
been thus acting in bad faith. Such was the consideration of
the trial judge (R. 111).
Defendant has cited the case of In re Flint, 25 Utah 338,
71 P. 531, for authority that the trial court, by its order setting
aside the conviction of defendant, dismissing the action against
him, and discharging him, lost jurisdiction of the case and
could not thereafter reconsider that order. We submit that
that case is not in point here. In the Flint case the trial court,
after the defendant had been convicted, but before he had
been sentenced, ordered the sentence indefinitely suspended,
and released defendant upon his own recognizance. The trial
court subsequently · had defendant arrested, brought before
him, sentenced him, and defendant was committed. Upon
habeas corpus, this court simply held that the trial court, on
these facts, lost jurisdiction, and the sentence therefore was
void. There is no indication that the order of the trial court
in the Flint case was procured by misrepresentations made to
the trial court, nor is there any indication whatsoever that
this proposition of law was considered. Here, defendant had
been sentenced, and was in the process of serving the sentence

14
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in the manner prescribed by the court. Through misrepresentation of his intent and the facts and circumstances surrounding his case, he procured an order setting aside his conviction
and discharging him. Because of these misrepresentations, the
trial court did not lose jurisdiction of the case. "The inherent
power of a court to set aside its judgment which was procured
by fraud and misrepresentation cannot be doubted." Lyons
v. Goldstein, supra.

CONCLUSION
The defendant in this appeal urges that the order of
October 20, 1949, setting aside the conviction of the defendant,
dismissing the action against the defendant, and discharging
him is based upon a valid act of the legislature, was final and
unconditional, divesting the court of jurisdiction, and that the
trial court was without power to revoke that order. He further urges that the order of June 9, 1951, setting aside the
order of October 20, 1949, is void and beyond the power of
the trial court for the reason that the court considered extrajudicial utterances and statements as a basis therefor. He also
claims that the condition upon which the order of October 20,
1949, was granted is void because it in effect constitutes banishment.
The theory of the State is that the order of October 20,
1949, setting aside the conviction of the defendant, dismissing
the action against him, and discharging him was procured by
the defendant through misrepresentations as to his intent provided that order be granted, and as to the facts and circum-

15
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stances surrounding his case at that time. These misrepresentations may not have constituted fraud in the legal sense, but
they were sufficient to show that the defendant was not dealing
honestly with the trial court (R. 111).
We respectfully submit that the record shows this absence of good faith on the part of the defendant in procuring
the order of the court of October 20, 1949. We further respectfully submit that the court has inherent jurisdiction to
vacate such an order upon those facts and that the trial court
in this instance acted properly and within its jurisdiction. This
being so, this court need not consider other questions raised,
but should affirm the order of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General
ALLEN B. SORENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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